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Attacker Behaviour Profiling using Stochastic
Ensemble of Hidden Markov Models
Soham Deshmukh, Rahul Rade, and Dr. Faruk Kazi, Department of Electrical Engineering, VJTI
Abstract—Cyber threat intelligence is one of the emerging ar-
eas of focus in information security. Much of the recent work has
focused on rule-based methods and detection of network attacks
using Intrusion Detection algorithms. In this paper we propose a
framework for inspecting and modelling the behavioural aspect
of an attacker to obtain better insight predictive power on his
future actions. For modelling we propose a novel semi-supervised
algorithm called Fusion Hidden Markov Model (FHMM) which
is more robust to noise, requires comparatively less training
time, and utilizes the benefits of ensemble learning to better
model temporal relationships in data. This paper evaluates the
performances of FHMM and compares it with both traditional
algorithms like Markov Chain, Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
and recently developed Deep Recurrent Neural Network (Deep
RNN) architectures. We conduct the experiments on dataset con-
sisting of real data attacks on a Cowrie honeypot system. FHMM
provides accuracy comparable to deep RNN architectures at
significant lower training time. Given these experimental results,
we recommend using FHMM for modelling discrete temporal
data for significantly faster training and better performance than
existing methods.
Index Terms—attacker behaviour modelling, cyber security,
fusion hidden markov models, hidden markov models, honeypot,
markov chain, sequence models, threat intelligence.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE existing cyber security tools focus on reactive meth-ods and algorithms as a major part of their cybersecu-
rity arsenal. In current world where organizations are highly
digital, a single vulnerability can lead to penetrative attack
negatively affecting business on a large scale. Moreover,
attackers now are leveraging automation and cloud to scale
their attacks faster and infiltrate systems in record break time.
Therefore, it is advisable for organization to stay one step
ahead of attackers and be able quickly foresee where and
when they will strike. Knowing the potential strike points or
actions of attacker the organization can take necessary steps
for mitigating cyber risks to organizations business.
The attacker may use multiple access point to deploy his
attack. Some attackers use persistent attack strategy consisting
of a sequence of attack behaviour continuously until the
intended target system is compromised [1]. Some attackers
tend to stay in the system for long time do trivial task to bypass
IDS and other things then later perform malicious act. These
type of attacks are difficult to track and detect. Moreover,
insider threats have become more prevalent and the breach
level index shows that almost 40% of the breaches are due to
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poor employee awareness of cyber security [3]. Although raw
data in the form of logs is abundantly available, it is difficult
and time-consuming to extract meaningful information based
on which proactive measures can be employed. Thus, it has
become indispensable to develop a solution which provides
threat intelligence capabilities to combat these attacks by being
both proactive and responsive.
In order to identify and mitigate security breaches, three
major types of network analysis are done: signature based,
anomaly based, and hybrid. Signature based techniques try to
detect attacks based on their signature [4]. They have less
false positive cases but are useless against new (zero-day)
attacks or attack not present in their database. Anomaly based
techniques model normal behaviour and detect deviations from
the normal behaviour. They have the capacity to detect zero-
day attacks. Additionally, they can be used to generate dataset
for signature based methods. However, the user or employee
can deviate from standard pattern of operation and this leads
to high amount of false alarms generated by anomaly based
approaches. Hybrid based methods combine both signature
and anomaly detection to increase detection [5] of threats and
reduce false positive alarms. Most of the Machine learning and
Deep learning based methods are hybrid methods. However,
all of this methods are supervised learning methods where the
algorithms need to be provided with labelled data in the form
of database, or time-series to accurately make predictions.
There is a need of unsupervised or semi-supervised al-
gorithm which can work on raw data dumps to provide
intimation of a potential attack or threat beforehand. For the
algorithm to be effective and employable for predicting threats
at organization level -
• Modelling capacity: The algorithm must have sufficient
modelling capacity for detecting nonlinear patterns in
sequential data.
• Time constraint: The algorithm must be scalable and
parallelizable to train on large data the organization
generates. It should provide predictions with low latency
and have low training time as the attackers can utilize the
downtime of algorithm to its advantage.
• Data Imbalance constraint: The algorithm should be able
to handle imbalanced data distribution where threat or
breaches are needle in a hack stack of normal behaviour
user or employee behaviour pattern.
• False Positives: The algorithm should be able to incorpo-
rate uncertainty and possibly inform uncertain predictions
rather than generating false positives.
With view to satisfy these constraints, we propose a new
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algorithm called Fusion Hidden Markov Model which exploits
the benefits of ensemble learning to produce better results. We
train a set of diverse HMMs on K different low-correlated
partitions of data and amalgamate the predictions of these
models using a nonlinear weight function. The nonlinear
function uses the posterior distribution over these HMMs to
generate a single output. One advantage of fitting a set of
HMMs is that each model learns temporal features unique to
a group of similar attack patterns, thus making FHMM less
susceptible to noise. We employ this approach to effectively
model attack patterns on file system based honeypots. The
predictive power of this model can be used to comprehend
the mindset of the attacker beforehand and would help in
preventing systems from being compromised.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Recent
work in the field of cyber security has been elaborated in
Section II. Section III provides a detailed problem formulation
along with an overview of the proposed system architecture. In
Section IV, we explain the proposed FHMM algorithm. Section
V includes experiments performed. We analyze the results of
these experiments and provide a comprehensive comparison
of FHMM with other commonly used sequence models for
modelling attacker behaviour. Finally, Section VI summarizes
and concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Threat intelligence or predictive threat intelligence is a
newly coined term which focuses on predictive methods for
cyber security. [26] suggested the use of big data analytics
for analyzing and handling the huge amount of data traffic.
One of the most prominently used machine learning based ap-
proach for insider threat or breach detection is user behaviour
profiling, M. Al-Qurishi [36]. In this approach, the sequential
actions of employee or student are modelled to form a profile
for that specific user. The most common patterns of actions
are termed as normal behaviour and any deviation from this
predefined path is considered as a deviation. This anomalous
activity is then marked for further investigation or potential
attack. For modelling normal behaviour of employees variety
of strategies are used. For detecting long-term anomalies
in cloud data, Owen et. al. [7] proposed using Extreme
Studentized Deviate test (ESD) and employing time series
decomposition and robust statistics for detecting anomalies.
While other methods in literature rely on combining user
action data with behavioural and personality characteristics,
Weiming Hu et.al.[2] and Jiong Zhang et. al. [4] propose the
use of bagging and boosting algorithms for intrusion detec-
tion. Apart from using collected or logged data on attacker
actions, past research literature has shown that behavioural
and personality characteristics can provide great insight in
profiling the attack. This particular example is shown by
Brdiczka et al. [8], which uses structural anomaly detection
combined with psychological profiling, in order to reduce false
positives compared to traditional anomaly detection. Work by
L. Spitzner [21] explores how honeypot technology can be
used to detect, identify and gather information on these specific
threats. Ultimately the task is to find out if there is an activity
being planned, and if so, find what stage the planning is in.
Karl Granstrom et. al [9] showed how Bernoulli filter can be
used to detect the presence of HMM in structured action data
along with minimum complexity that an HMM would need to
involve in order that it be detectable with reasonable fidelity.
Recently, a lot of work has focused on rigorous analysis
of data collected by honeypots using machine learning and
statistical techniques. Despite potential limitations on the
availability of data in the majority of prior research, intrinsic
patterns in cyber attacks have been identified. For example,
Z. Zhan et. al. [23] demonstrated the presence of long-range
temporal dependencies in attack patterns captured by low-
interaction honeypots. Owning to the presence of long-range
dependencies in the rich information captured by honeypots,
various frameworks have been proposed which exploit these
statistical properties for modelling cyber attacks [25]. Other
framework proposed involve [28] deals with graph-based
clustering of time-series attack patterns thereby identifying
the activities of worms and botnets present in the honeypot
traffic. A technique proposed in [25] employs a similarity
metric called squared prediction error (SPE) for computing
distance between observation projected in residual space and
the k-dimensional hyperspace determined by PCA. This metric
was used to identify new attack patterns in the honeypot
logs. On the other hand, the intent behind cyber attacks also
provide a fair indication of the target of the attacker and
several approaches for intent prediction using HMMs [16]
have been developed. To detect intrusions, Nong Ye et.al.[18]
employed two EWMA techniques to detect anomalous changes
in event intensity specifically for correlated and uncorre-
lated data. Behaviour-rule based intrusion detection methods
where also investigated in domain of cyber physical systems
particularly in Smart Grid Applications by Robert Mitchell
[12] which demonstrated that detecting attackers based on
behaviour features led to low false positives. On the other
hand, Dawei [17] Shi used stochastic modelling framework
particularly using finite state hidden markov model to solve
joint state and attack estimation problem. Erland et. al. [13]
found time feature to be extremely important in modelling
attacker behaviour and the attack process can be split into
three phases namely the learning phase, standard phase and
innovative attack phase. [22] suggested the use of game theory
approach by formulating a Bayesian game to understand the
attacker-defender interactions in honeypot-enabled networks.
The use of Hidden Markov Models for modelling normal
behaviour (against attacker actions) was proposed by Tabish
Rashid et. al [6] for detection insider threat. There is significant
work been done in improving HMM and its learning algorithm.
The ability of HMM has to model sequence is dependent on
the structure of HMM. Though the integration over all possible
model structures are not possible, structures suited to specific
domain like profile hmm [10] are developed. In the context
of biological sequence analysis, researchers have used genetic
algorithm to determine the structure of HMM [11]. Mathias
Johansson et. al. [20] employs a unified Bayesian treatment
to derive posterior probability for different model structures
within class of multinomial, Markov, Hidden Markov models
without assuming prior knowledge of transition probabilities.
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The searching of hmm structure followed by learning makes
the approach infeasible in domains of cyber security where
latency is of utmost importance.
III. PRELIMINARY RESEARCH CONTEXT
A. Problem Formulation
Given previous actions Si|t of attacker at each timestep t,
we intend to predict the next action attacker will likely take.
Here Si are discrete states corresponding to attacker action
where i  (0, N).
The goal of our system is to achieve accurate attack pre-
diction with low prediction latency and training time. The
algorithm, beforehand, should determine the optimal sequence
length and number of HMMs to employ to achieve some
global minima. Given the predictions of HMMs, the algorithm
must use them to accurately predict future states. Another
challenging task is to update models when necessary, which is
aimed to correct the model without incurring large overhead to
the monitored infrastructure. We proposed a possible scheme
for these issues in this paper.
B. Brief introduction to HMM
FHMM uses HMM as its backbone algorithm for learn-
ing relationship between defined discrete states. An HMM
[19][29] is a statistical Markov model with hidden states.
These hidden states are not directly visible to the observer. The
HMM can be completely defined by parameters A (transition
matrix), B (observation matrix), pi (prior probability) as
λ = θ(A,B, pi) (1)
Two assumptions are made by the model. The first, called
the Markov assumption, states that the current state is de-
pendent only on the previous state. The second, called the
independence assumption, states that the output observation at
time t is dependent only on the current state; it is independent
of previous observations and states. Given a set of examples
from a process, we would be able to estimate the model
parameters λ = θ(A,B, pi) that best describe that process.
Then, we could discover the hidden state sequence that was
most likely to have produced a given observation sequence.
More details can be found in [19].
C. HMM from Bayesian Perspective
In the Bayesian approach we assume some prior knowledge
about the learning process or structure employed. For the case
of HMM, the prior knowledge in encoded in terms of arcs
of HMM, and model parameters. This prior knowledge is
represented in terms of prior distribution is used to obtain
posterior distribution over model structure and parameters.
More formally, assuming a prior distribution over model
structure P (M) and a prior distribution over parameters for
each model structure P (θ|M), a data set D is used to form a
posterior distribution over models using Bayes rule [35]:
P (M |D) =
∫
P (D|θ,M)P (θ|M)dθP (M)
P (D)
(2)
which averages over uncertainty in parameters. The posterior
distribution over parameters is computed as:
P (θ|M,D) = P (D|θ,M)P (θ|M)
P (D|M) (3)
If we wish to predict the next observation, YT+1 based on our
data and models, the Bayesian prediction
P (YT+1|D) =
∫
P (YT+1|θ,M,D)P (θ|M,D)P (M |D)dθdM
(4)
averages over both the uncertainty in the model structure and
its parameters. This is known as the predictive distribution for
the model [35].
For complex attacker behaviour modelling problems, using
sequences with different characteristics to learn one Hidden
Markov Model leads to too much generalization and thus los-
ing the discriminating characteristics of the different attackers.
Thus, it is evident that the use of diverse attack sessions,
to train a single model, would lead to loss of information
which might be unique to a small number of attack sequences.
For a threat intelligence model, capturing this information
becomes important since it might a crude attack to hack
into the system. The proposed approach, called fusion HMM
(FHMM), attempts to partition the training data according
to the distribution of the number of attack sessions with
respect to their lengths, and then train multiple HMMs in
a semi-supervised fashion. The predictions of these models
are combined using a nonlinear network to provide better,
robust predictions. This approach, thus aims to capture the
characteristics of the attack sequences that would be lost while
using a single global model.
IV. METHODOLOGY
Using a single Bayesian structure like HMM to model the
joint distribution of all the observations and hidden state,
makes optimising θ to maximise the likelihood intractable.
Particularly when the data set D consists of mixture of dis-
tributions over different sequence types where the individual
distribution might not be a Gaussian in nature, optimising θ
to maximise the likelihood P (D|θ,M) becomes challenging.
Hence we propose segmenting data set D into sub parts such
that D =
{
D(1), D(2), ...D(K)
}
where D(i) are independent
and identically distributed observation sets. Empirical method-
ology for segmenting data set into K parts is provided in this
section. The benefits of this segmentation are made apparent
in further equations. Intuitively, this is equivalent to breaking
down the problem into smaller independent sub-problem of
P (YT+1|D(i)), which allows using different θ values to reach
a local minima for that sub-problem. Modifying the original
equation to incorporate sub data set:
K∏
i=1
P (YT+1|D(i)) =
∫ K∏
i=1
P (YT+1|θ,M,D(i)) P (θ|M,D(i))
P (M |D(i)) dθdM
(5)
In the limit of large data set and an uninformative or
uniform prior over parameters, the posterior P (θ |M,D(i))
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will be sharply peaked around the maxima of the likelihood,
and therefore the predictions of a single maximum likelihood
model will be similar to those obtained by Bayesian integration
over parameters.
K∏
i=1
P (θ|M,D(i)) =
K∏
i=1
P (D(i)|θ,M) (6)
The maximum likelihood (ML) model parameters are ob-
tained by maximising the likelihood or log likelihood.
L(θ,M) =
K∏
i=1
P (D(i)|θ,M) (7)
Further we assume a limiting case of Bayesian approach to
learning if we assume a single model structure M and we
estimate the parameter vector θ that maximising the likelihood
P (Y (i)|θ) under that model. If model structure is assumed
constant,
L(θ) =
K∏
i=1
P (D(i)|θ) (8)
logL(θ) = log
K∏
i=1
P (D(i)|θ) (9)
logL(θ) = logP (D(1)|θ)+logP (D(2)|θ)+ .. logP (D(K)|θ)
(10)
logL(θ) = logL1(θ) + logL2(θ) + .. logLK(θ) (11)
In order to maximize the overall log likelihood with respect
to model θ, we need to maximize the individual log likelihood
terms where θ in each term can be different corresponding to
differing model parameters required to aptly represent the joint
distribution observation and hidden state.
logL(θ) =
K∑
i=1
logLi(θi) (12)
These individual models are represented by HMM whose
parameters are estimated by Baum Welch algorithm, a spe-
cial case of EM algorithm. We train K HMM indepen-
dently on each sub-data using Baum Welch, such that
λ(i) = argmax
θ
P (D(i)|θ) where i ∈ (0, ..K). If Y (i) ={
Y
(i)
0 , Y
(i)
1 , ...
}
is a sample sequence in D(i) then,
P (Y
(i)
N+1|Y (i)1:N , λi) =
P (Y
(i)
1:N , Y
(i)
N+1|λi)
P (Y
(i)
1:N |λi)
(13)
P (Y
(i)
N+1|Y (i)1:N , λ) ∝ P (Y (i)1:N , Y (i)N+1|λi) (14)
Xi = argmax
YN+1
P (Y
(i)
1:N , Y
(i)
N+1|λi) (15)
The denominator being independent from YN+1, we com-
pute P (Y (i)1:N , Y
(i)
N+1|λi) for each possible YN+1. The value of
YN+1 which provides maximum likelihood can be estimated
as the best guess for the next observation for model λi. We
now have Xi which are estimates obtained from multiple
distributions P (YT+1|D(i)) instead of a estimate derived from
a single distribution P (YT+1|D).
The true estimate given D =
{
D(1), D(2), ...D(K)
}
is a
combination of Xi’s which might not be a linear combination.
Let function f be used to represent the non linear deterministic
component of the approximation, wt the random noise, then
the true output YT+1 is given by:
YT+1 = f(Xi) + wt (16)
Expressing true outcome YT+1 is this form, helps in cir-
cumventing time-invariant assumption of state transition and
emission matrix of earlier trained HMM λi. Therefore the
function f along with incorporating the Bayesian analysis of
HMM, now incorporates time-step t as input which acts as
a deciding factor for providing non-linear weight-age to each
Xi
YT+1 = f(Xi, t) + wt (17)
We choose to approximate this mapping of Xi, t to YT+1 by
neural network.
Thus, the proposed Fusion Hidden Markov Model (FHMM)
algorithm can be subdivided into three major steps -
1) Finding optimum value of K according to the distri-
bution of input sequences and clustering data into K
diverse groups.
2) Training K different Hidden Markov Models on the K
subgroups.
3) Learning mapping of individual HMM predictions to a
single prediction using a Neural Network.
The basic terminology used in this paper is as follows -
Let,
T = length of the observation sequence
N = number of states in the model
M = number of observation symbols
Q = distinct states of Markov process =
{
q0, q1, .., qN1
}
V = set of possible observations =
{
0, 1, ...,M1
}
pi = initial state distribution
A = state transition probabilities = P (xt+1|xt)
A = aij with shape NxN where aij =
P(state qj at t+ 1 | state qi at t) = P (xt+1|xt)
B = observation probability matrix = P (yt|xt)
B = bj(k) with shape NxM where bj(k) =
P (observation k at t | state qj at t) = P (yt|xt)
O = (O0, O1, ..., OT1) = observation sequence
where Oi  Vx for i = 0, 1, ..., T − 1
An HMM is completely defined by parameters A, B and
and denoted by λ = θ(A,B, pi).
A. Partitioning Data into K Groups
An important part of any ensemble learning algorithm is
to partition data into non-correlated subsets which will make
learning from it fruitful. The non-correlated K subsets of data
also make sure HMMs are fitted to different information subset
which when combined will characterise the whose time-series
data. The number K is a hyperparameter which characterizes
the complexity of the data. There exists a tradeoff between
K used and time required to train HMM as complexity of
data increases. To satisfy the above conditions FHMM uses
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a dissimilarity function f(F) to divide data into K subsets
such that each subset captures a particular pattern of temporal
data. The dissimilarity function is a custom defined distance
function whose definition would change depending on the
type of data used (some of the definitions are provided in
appendix). Initially, dividing data depending upon length of
sequence provides two benefit -
• The data of similar length generally originates from same
distribution. To illustrate, in case of cyber attacks, the
attacks of similar length generally employ same attack
strategy and pattern. This makes sure that we are captur-
ing attacker mindset or bot attack patterns in subset of
data. This will help HMM to learn the pattern quickly
with higher accuracy.
• From implementation and operational point of view.
HMMs train on data of same length comparatively faster
as compared to data consisting of variable length.
• Diverse state transitions are present in attack sequences of
significantly different lengths. Thus, it becomes difficult
for a single HMM to accurately model it.
The data partitioned into different subsets by length is then
chosen for the ensemble depending on its correlation with each
other. For each sub dataset Di where i  int(0,max(l)) we
compute a frequency occurrence array. This frequency array
is computed for each sub dataset Di. The frequency array
consists of occurence of discrete states in the sub dataset
Di. This frequency occurrence array consists of occurence
of each state divided by total states seen. The frequency
array characterises the sub-dataset Di quantitatively which
makes it possible to compare its similarity with other Di.
The G sub dataset Di is represented by a 1xN frequency
array vector where N is number of discrete states. Then the
GxN frequency matrix is used to obtain a set of datasets Dj
called similarity set, which is similar to a particular dataset Di
by computing euclidean distance between the corresponding
frequency arrays. These similar sets are used to rank datasets
Di to select K datasets Di from total G sub dataset Di such
that these K datasets are diverse, have low correlation with
each other and cover most of the training data.
Algorithm 1 Choosing and Training HMM
Input: j = [O0, O1, .Oi], N,M ,
Dissimilarity function (f(F ))
Output: [λ0, λ1, .λB ]
1: L = max length (j)
2: for all 0 in j do
3: Di =O where iint(0, L)
4: end for
5: for all Di do
6: Compute Frequency array F [i] where iV
7: end for
8: Construct similarity sets S by computing Euclidean dis-
tance between frequency arrays F [i]
9: Assign Ranks Ri, where iV using S
10: Use Ri to obtain lengths li
11: return li
B. Training K HMMs
In the second step, a group of attack sequences in the
training data Di, is used to learn an HMM model λi. Although
the use of small set of attack sequences to learn an HMM λi
might lead to overfitting, in a broader context, it ensures that
each model captures the set of characteristics distinct to that
group of sequences. Each Hidden Markov Model λi is trained
using Baum-Welch algorithm [19] along with Expectation
Maximization step (EM) [34] in order to train the parameters
(transition, emission and prior probabilities) of the model. EM
maximizes the likelihood of each sequence with respect to the
corresponding model λi i.e., P (Di|λi). Thus, each model is
capable of accurately predicting future steps in a sequence
which belongs to the probability distribution learnt by it. The
detailed training algorithm is given below. In each model the
number of hidden states can be viewed a hyper-parameter
which can be tuned.
Algorithm 2 Individual Hidden Markov Model Training and
Updating Process
Input: O,N,M
Output: HMM Parameters λ = (A,B, pi)
1: Random Initialize λ = (A,B, pi)
2: Forward pass: Compute αt(i)
Normalize computed αt(i)
3: Backward pass: Compute βt(i) recursively
Normalize computed βt(i)
4: Compute
Di-gammas
Gammas
5: Re-estimate A,B, and pi
6: Compute log[P (O|λ)]
7: if log[P (O|λ)]new > log[P (O|λ)]old then
8: Go to step 2
9: else
10: return λ = (A,B, pi)
11: end if
12: End
Algorithm 3 Individual Hidden Markov Model Prediction
Process
Input: O, λ, V
Output: Xk(t)
1: Initialize: U array
2: for k in V do
3: O.append(V, k)
4: Compute Gamma
5: U .append(Uk)
6: end for
7: return argmax(U )
8: Train individual HMM on Di where ili
9: return [λ0, λ1, .λB]
C. Combining Predictions of K HMMs
The resulting predictions from K Hidden Markov Models
are then aggregated by neural network to generate a combined
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prediction for next step. The neural network layer consists of a
linear weight component followed by a nonlinear function. It
minimizes the mean squared error of the HMM predictions
on the training data and assigns a probabilistic weight to
each HMM. Thus, the neural network layer learns a nonlinear
mapping from the predictions of HMMs to the next state
output. The K Hidden Markov Model predictions are then
assigned a weight W where equation (summation of W over
all K HMM = 1). This importance to particular HMMs output
characterized by weight W is learnt by iterating through
samples. The problem is now defined as given predictions
[X0, X1, .XK] from HMM [λ0, λ1, .λK ] at timestep t = T−1,
what is the likely action the attacker will take at timestep
t = T . FHMM uses supervised neural network, as shown in
figure 1, for learning the weight W in training phase from N
data samples and then uses the learned weight W to estimating
the future action taken. The network used is characterized by
-
Fig. 1. Mapping estimates using neural network
αlj = σ(
∑
k
(wljkα
l−1
k + b
l
j) (18)
where alj is the activation and b
l
j of the jth neuron in the lth
layer.
We define a cost C which is used as a measure to indicate
the offset of predicted action from actual action taken. We
define the cost C over all samples n of data as:
C =
1
2n
∑
x
||y(x)− αL(x)|| (19)
This equation characterises the difference in the true output
y(x) and the output predicted by network y′ = aL(x). Then
we use backpropagation [32] to compute the gradients and
update the weights by -
3 equations: error compute, bias and weight update equa-
tion.
The depth of network required in terms of layers L increases
as the complexity of pattern increases. Apart from neural net-
works superior ability to model nonlinear complex relationship
in data, it has following benefits over traditional parametric
approaches -
• Neural Network generalize well to unseen data and can
infer unseen patterns not initially present in data provided
in training. This is extremely crucial in cyber security
applications where new attacks consists of previously
employed strategies intermittently spread throughout the
attack. The neural network can detect this type of sub-
pattern in attack and therefore complements the ability of
HMM.
• Unlike HMM and other parametric techniques, neural
network does not impose restriction on the distribution of
the input variables. Moreover, neural networks can better
model heteroscedasticity, while traditional model fail in to
model data with high volatility and non-constant variance
which is common in cyber security applications.
The training and evaluating phase is given in pseudo-code
below:
Algorithm 4 Second Stage Data Collection
Input: O, [λ0, λ1, ..., λB]
Output: Xk
1: for k in n do
2: Xk = Predictions(λ,O, V )
3: end for
Training phase:
Input: [X0, X1, ..., Xk], Y, z
Output: f(x; , w)
1: Initialize: W,w randomly
2: Y ′ = wT .max(0,WTx+ c) + b with L2 regularization
3: Compute C = Cost(Y, Y ′)
4: Update parameters:
Wnew =Wold − C.z
Wnew =WoldC.z
5: if Cost(Ynew, O) ¡ Cost(Yold, O) then
6: Go to step 1
7: else
8: return f(x; , w)
9: end if
Evaluation phase:
Input: [X0, X1, ..., Xk]
Output: Y ′
1: Y ′ = wT .max(0,WTx+ c) + b
D. Overall Algorithm
During training stage, FHMM algorithm takes multiple at-
tack sequence consisting of discrete states as input. Depending
on sequence length and rank computed using dissimilarity
function it selects and divides data into least correlated K sub
data. Then the predictions obtained from K HMM trained to
overfit on the K sub data are fed to an neural network for
learning the weightage of each HMM.
During prediction phase, the intermediate HMM predictions
are fed to neural network which outputs a single value of next
state in sequence of attack.
Figure 2 illustrate the training and prediction phases in
FHMM algorithm.
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Fig. 2. Overall FHMM Algorithm
V. EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Dataset Used
For collecting real attack logs, we had setup Cowrie hon-
eypot [31] which is a medium interaction SSH and telnet
honeypot. Honeypot is a decoy system with the sole intention
of tricking attacker with an easy target to log his attack
patterns. In case of Cowrie, the attack patterns are logged
in JSON format. The detailed description of attack features
logged and dataset description is provided in [15] by Rahul
et. al. We processed events in Cowrie logs and divided them
into 19 commands consisting of:
client.size, client.version, command.failed,
command.input/delete, command.input/dir-sudo,
command.input/other, command.input/system,
command.input/write, command.success, direct-tcpip.data,
direct-tcpip.request, log.closed, log.open,
login.failed, login.success, session.closed,
session.connect, session.file-download, session.input
We encoded these events as discrete states labelled 0 to 18.
These 19 states were used for modelling and prediction in
HMM, LSTM and FHMM algorithm. The data is grouped by
session id for considering each sequence where each session
id corresponds to the sequence of actions taken by hacker. The
assumption made here is different session id are independent
of individual attacker characteristics and hence dividing de-
pending on session ID rather than source IP wouldnt affect
the modelling and prediction by a large factor.
The dataset used for training FHMM was extracted from
the logs generated by Cowrie honeypot from April 2017 to
July 2017. By processing these logs, we generated 22,499
distinct attack sessions involving the sequence of steps taken
by a particular source IP. The attack sessions lasted from
2 steps to over 1400 steps. These sessions are raw logs of
shell interaction performed by the attacker. We evaluate the
performance of FHMM on a separate test set comprising of
real time logs of attackers actions for 1 month.
B. Partitioning Data into K groups
In cyber security logs, there are multiple attacks from differ-
ent hackers of variable attack lengths. This results in logs being
generated which are varied in terms of types, pattern, sequence
length, and duration of attack or infiltration. The data can be
divided into sub-datasets depending on either of the factors,
each with its merits and demerits. Due to phenomena prevalent
in cyber security domain where attacks of similar length
following similar patterns, we have considered the distribution
of the number of attack sessions with respect to their lengths
and partitioned the preprocessed training data according to
lengths. Figure 3 shows the distribution of number of attack
sessions with respect to their lengths.
Once the data is divided into sub-datasets we can train N
number of HMM on the sub-datasets and pass their predictions
to Neural Network. But to provide fast response time to
prevent real-time attack, training and predictions of N HMMs
where N can be in thousands is not practically feasible. Hence
we use similarity measures to reduce the sub-datasets from N
to K. In order to divide training data into K sets, we construct
19-dimensional frequency arrays F [i] for each dataset Di
consisting of sequences of length i where 1 ≤ i ≤ L. The
frequency arrays describe the distribution of different states in
terms of probability of occurrence of each state across multiple
attacks of same length. Figure 5 shows these frequency arrays
reduced to 2-dimensional vector space by employing Principal
Component Analysis (PCA) [33]. Using frequency array F [i]
to characterise all attacks of particular length, is sufficiently
accurate to compute dissimilarity measure between attacks
of different lengths. It is also essential the sub-dataset K
produced from N be containing maximum information along
with being mutually exclusive and dissimilar with one another.
Euclidean distance between these arrays along each of 19 di-
mension provides the dissimilarity between the arrays. Hence
we compute euclidean distance between these arrays F [i] to
find dissimilar sets and select K datasets such that these K
datasets cover maximum information present in the training
data. The selected K datasets out of N total datasets helps
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Fig. 3. Distribution of number of attacker sessions with respect to duration
Fig. 4. Distribution of states predicted by different HMMs
in reducing training and prediction time without significantly
affecting accuracy of deployed system.
The figure 7 depicts individual HMM error curve while
training.
C. Training K HMMs
The K datasets selected, are used to train K different
HMMs This HMMs are trained until convergence using Baum
Welsh algorithm. HMM is implemented in cython and trained
parallely, thus reducing computation time by a large factor.
Then each of the K HMMs predicts the next possible state,
resulting in K predictions for next state which are fed to neural
network.
To illustrate the practical need of splitting data and training
K different HMM, see the figures 4, 5 and 6. The figure 4
shows HMM trained on different lengths and the distribution
of output states predicted by HMM. Here each state type is
represented by different color and clearly shows why different
K HMMs are required to model entire data. Moreover, the
figure also depicts that each HMM is learning different data
patterns unique to an attacking type.
D. Combining Predictions of K HMMs
The predictions of these HMMs are combined by a neural
network containing 60 units with ReLU activation. Selecting
Fig. 5. 2-D plot of frequency arrays
Fig. 6. Correlation plot between predictions of individual HMMs
the optimum value of K is a classical bias-variance tradeoff.
Large values of k (>50) lead to poor generalization on test
data. Table I shows the weight assigned to each feature input
given to neural network in descending order. Here the features
are prediction made by HMM of trained on particular length.
The table clearly indicates temporal feature count has the
highest importance in determining the next state taken by
attacker, followed by predictions from HMM trained on length
11 and 44.
E. Quantitative Results
Selecting the optimum value of K is a tradeoff between
error rate and computational requirements. Increasing the
value of K reduces the error rate. Figure 8 shows a plot of
error rate vs number of models in FHMM.
As evident, there is a significant reduction in error due to
adding learners to the fusion. For our dataset, much of the
reduction appears after 20-25 classifiers. One reason for this
is the diverse set of features learnt by HMMs - 23, 24 and 25.
This is evident from the correlation between the predictions
of individual HMMs as shown in figure 6.
After 35-40 models, the error reduction for FHMM appears
to have nearly reached a plateau. So, we primarily focus on
the performance of FHMM for K = 38. Table II shows the
prediction accuracy attained by FHMM with K = 25 and
K = 38 along with that of other sequence models such as
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Fig. 7. Error rate while training a single HMM
Markov chain, single HMM and LSTM. Depending on how
the HMMs in FHMM are trained, the training time differs.
As the training of individual HMM is independent of other
HMMs, this allows parallel training with faster training times
compared to sequential training pipeline.
TABLE I
WEIGHTS ASSIGNED BY NEURAL NETWORK TO INDIVIDUAL HMMS
Weight Feature
12.0151 ± 0.0308 count
4.6469 ± 0.0179 hmm 11.0
3.9593 ± 0.0131 hmm 44.0
3.9512 ± 0.0261 hmm 13.0
2.9618 ± 0.0069 hmm 188.0
2.6922 ± 0.0071 hmm 106.0
2.6831 ± 0.0089 hmm 23.0
2.6451 ± 0.0069 hmm 127.0
2.5365 ± 0.0214 hmm 28.0
2.3346 ± 0.0166 hmm 18.0
2.2671 ± 0.0220 hmm 76.0
2.1762 ± 0.0204 hmm 129.0
2.0389 ± 0.0093 hmm 199.0
1.7186 ± 0.0198 hmm 4.0
1.6456 ± 0.0043 hmm 80.0
1.5216 ± 0.0082 hmm 9.0
1.4252 ± 0.0136 hmm 6.0
1.3633 ± 0.0047 hmm 20.0
1.3594 ± 0.0037 hmm 69.0
1.2440 ± 0.0063 hmm 194.0
1.2393 ± 0.0072 hmm 197.0
1.1861 ± 0.0085 hmm 14.0
1.1355 ± 0.0061 hmm 31.0
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF ACCURACY OBTAINED BY DIFFERENT MODELS
Model Accuracy Training Time (in hrs)
Markov Chain 72 0.3
HMM 77 1
LSTM 86 5
FHMM (K=25, sequential) 87.19 2.3
FHMM (K=38, sequential) 90.82 2.5
FHMM (K=25, parallel) 87.19 1.3
FHMM (K=38, parallel) 90.82 1.5
One obvious conclusion drawn from the results is that the
reduction in error rate provided by FHMM is very large as
compared to that of a single learner. Additionally, FHMM has
a better generalization ability than single models which may be
Fig. 8. Error rate vs number of HMMs in FHMM algorithm
attributed to the following reasons. The training data contains
considerably diverse information and it becomes difficult for a
single learner to learn a generalized joint probability distribu-
tion over the data. Thus, we use many learners which perform
well on parts of data. These learners may learn different
distributions over the data and combining them is a convenient
choice. Training many learners also circumvents the imperfect
search process of HMM. In HMM, we assume some prior
knowledge about the learning process and the model structure
and the desired complex input-output mapping may not be
present in the hypothesis space being searched by the learning
algorithm. In such cases, exploiting multiple learners provides
a better estimate.
F. Limitations
Although FHMM algorithm is robust to noise and provides
a significant reduction in error rate while modelling attack
sequences, it has some limitations common to other ensemble
methods. The basic requirement of FHMM is that the base
HMMs should be diverse and must have low correlation with
each other for a significant reduction in error rate over train
distribution. However, creating diverse base models is not
always possible. Moreover, it requires the use of techniques
such as partitioning data into diverse groups and initializing
the base learners differently to induce heterogeneity. In ad-
dition, FHMM is complex and computationally expensive as
compared to simple probabilistic algorithms such as Markov
chain and HMM. With FHMM, learning time and memory
constraints need to be taken care of.
G. Other Applications
The proposed FHMM algorithm can be easily extended
to other sequence problems where the goal is to predict the
next state in the sequence. While the hidden state and the
observation spaces are discrete in the above FHMM algorithm,
the FHMM can also be used to model continuous observations.
Potential applications include stock prices prediction, speech
synthesis, time-series analysis, gene prediction and parts-of-
speech tagging. For these applications, the major portion of the
algorithm would remain identical with a change in the criteria
for partitioning data into K groups. For this purpose, other
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TABLE III
ACCURACY OBTAINED FOR DIFFERENT STATES BY FHMM (K=38)
State 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
FHMM 0 0 59.1 70.2 92.9 68.2 0 97.2 99.6 59 54.3 53.6 99.1 41.6 37.3 42.4 - 25.6 42.9
HMM 9 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63.2 35.5 0 0 0 37.2 0 - 0 0
HMM 11 0 0 82.9 66.3 0 0 0 0 2.1 0 0 0 97.5 0 62.5 0 - 0 0
HMM 44 0 100 0.1 12.7 0 0 0 0 6.3 0 9.7 13.2 0.8 0 37.2 0.1 - 7.1 0
HMM 71 0 0 53.4 35.3 0 72.4 0 17.3 81.3 0 0 9.4 0 0 0 40.8 - 0 0
HMM 199 0 0 0 73 73.2 0 0 0 96.9 0 0 0 97.5 0 62.5 0 - 0 0
methods such as clustering and similarity measures like cosine
distance can be employed depending on the training data
and the application. After incorporating a suitable partitioning
technique, the FHMM algorithm can be identically applied to
other sequencing tasks.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes Fusion Hidden Markov Model which
exploits the benefit of ensemble learning for modelling be-
havioural aspect of attacker to obtain better insight on pre-
dicting his future actions. FHMM provides compelling results
while modelling temporal patterns due to its higher mod-
elling capacity, robustness to noise, and reduced training time.
FHMMs superiority is substantiated by comparing against
traditional approaches of Markov Chain, HMM, deep LSTM.
The model is evaluated on Cowrie Honeypot dataset which
consists of large number of diverse real-time attack sessions.
Keeping initial conditions and preprocessing constant, the
proposed architecture outperforms other traditional and bench-
mark models. In addition, we explored FHMM in depth,
with highlights to individual parameter contribution to the
overall model. The architecture of FHMM allows it to be
generalized to other domains, where nature of dissimilarity
between sequence is not linearly mapped.
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